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Introduction 
 
Resolution WHA 63.14 urges Member States ‘to cooperate with civil society and with public 
and private stakeholders in implementing the set of recommendations on the marketing of 
foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children in order to reduce the impact of that 
marketing, while ensuring avoidance of potential conflicts of interest’ (our emphasis). The 
Recommendations themselves also warn Member States against conflicts of interest. In 
particular, Recommendation 6 provides that ‘governments should be the key stakeholders in 
the development of policy […]. In setting the national policy framework, governments may 
choose to allocate defined roles to other stakeholders, while protecting the public interest and 
avoiding conflict of interest.’ As paragraph 21 of the explanatory notes accompanying the 
Recommendations further emphasizes, this is because ‘governments are in the best position 
to set direction and overall strategy to achieve population-wide public health goals’.  
 
A conflict of interest, which has been defined as a situation where ‘interests or commitments 
compromise … independent judgment or … loyalty’,1 are ‘pervasive features of life within 
all complex societies’.2 The question therefore arises how existing, potential or perceived 
conflicts of interest should be managed in global public health.
3
 
 
Regrettably, however, WHO has not yet given clear guidance as to what would constitute a 
conflict of interest, thus allowing major players in the food industry to act as if industry itself 
had become legitimate market regulators by adopting loophole ridden, voluntary pledges not 
to promote unhealthy food to children under 12 years of age in certain media (let alone 
teenagers).   
 
This contribution has a twofold purpose: first, to argue that self-regulation cannot provide a 
long-term solution to the failure of governments to adequately implement the 
Recommendations; and secondly, to urge the WHO to provide the necessary guidance which 
would allow Member States to determine the nature and extent of their involvement with 
food industry operators in implementing the Recommendations, and more generally in 
preventing and controlling obesity and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs) associated 
with food, alcohol, tobacco, breast-milk substitutes, and sedentary work and play. 
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I. The failure of the WHO to tackle conflicts of interest in NCD prevention and 
control policies 
 
There is a widely-held expectation among citizens that governments should serve voters, 
without bias toward the moneyed interests among them. This applies not just to law- and 
policy-setting, but also program development, and priority-setting in governments. The 
opportunities for conflicts of interest to cause problems are especially numerous in the realm 
of public policy because of its far-reaching potential impact on commerce, and in relation to 
NCD prevention and control more specifically, where the food; the tobacco and the alcohol 
industries have been identified as ‘vectors of disease’.4      
 
Mandating transparency about conflicts of interest is a necessary, but insufficient safeguard. 
There is far more to dealing with conflict of interests than merely recognizing and disclosing 
them. Industry operators have fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders to make profits 
whatever the health cost to consumers.
5
 It therefore should be obvious that there are likely to 
be ‘significant limits to the compatibility of industry interests with public health’,6 and that 
food business actors should not be entrusted with the development of public health policies: 
 
Firms that participate in costly [Corporate Social Responsibility] activities will have 
to raise prices, reduce wages and other costs, accept smaller profits, or pay smaller 
dividends—and accept the economic consequences. After taking such measures, a 
firm’s stock price may decline until proportional to returns, and attracting new capital 
may be difficult because returns are below market averages. Other short-term 
economic consequences may include loss of market share, increased insurance costs, 
increased borrowing costs, and loss of reputation. In the long term, the firm may face 
shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or closure [emphasis added].
7
 
 
Since its establishment in 1948, the WHO has projected its concern and resolve to safeguard 
against commercial conflicts of interest. Its Constitution articulates a commitment to 
establish the independence of the Director General and WHO staff from the narrow political 
interests of any one Member State or ‘other external authority’.8 Similarly, the ‘Principles 
Governing Relations between the World Health Organization and Nongovernmental 
Organizations’, published as part of the WHO’s ’Basic Documents’ along with WHO’s 
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Constitution, provided that ‘the main area of competence of the NGO shall fall within the 
purview of WHO. Its aims and activities shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and 
principles of the Constitution of WHO, shall centre on development work in health or health-
related fields, and shall be free from concerns which are primarily of a commercial or profit-
making nature.’9  
   
Certain WHO instruments take a clear stance on what would constitute a conflict of interest. 
Most notably, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) contains a specific 
and unequivocal prohibition against the involvement of the tobacco industry in the 
development and implementation of tobacco control policies.
10
 Similarly, the International 
Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes calls upon Member States to ban all 
commercial marketing of breast-milk substitutes in consideration of the special 
vulnerabilities of mothers to commercial influence.
11
   
 
However, the WHO Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, which was adopted in 
2004, is less clear on the role that it envisages for the food industry in the prevention and 
control of overweight and obesity. On the one hand, the main aim of the WHO strategy was 
to challenge the food and beverage sectors primarily in Europe and the USA to do far more to 
improve nutrition and help tackle obesity prevention. Led by both European and US sugar 
trade lobbyists, these powerful sectors had adopted confrontational positions; at a critical 
moment prior to the WHO Executive Board meeting in Geneva to consider the draft strategy, 
they appeared to have secured strong support from the US government. This was effectively 
disarmed in an open letter from Professor Kaare Norum, the Norwegian chair of the WHO’s 
strategy reference group.
12
 By the time health ministers had endorsed the strategy, the food 
and beverage trade group, CIAA (now FoodDrinkEurope) and its US counterpart, the 
Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA), issued terse statements purporting to support the 
WHO Strategy. On the other hand, however, the wording of the Strategy is ambiguous 
concerning the involvement it foresees for food companies and their associations. Not only 
does it explicitly encourage governments to consult stakeholders, including the private sector 
and the media, on policy, but it also encourages them to establish mechanisms to promote 
their participation in activities related to diet, physical activity and health,
13
 thus formalizing 
institutional conflicts of interest. Similarly, it provides that ‘[WHO] will hold discussions 
with the transnational food industry and other parts of the private sector in support of the 
aims of the Strategy, and of implementing the recommendations in countries’.14 In other 
words, it starts from the premise that the food industry can play a positive role in the 
prevention and control of overweight and obesity worldwide, even though it has not defined 
in any specific terms what this role could be.  Of course, hearing from industry is, of itself, 
not problematic.  However, putting companies in a privileged position to shape opinions, 
advice, or standards upon which governments rely is an abdication of responsibility which is 
against the public interest. 
 
                                                 
9
 At paragraph 3.1 (emphasis added). This text was adopted at the 40
th
 session of the World Health Assembly in 
1987 by Resolution WHA40.25. 
10
  Article 5(3) of the WHO FCTC: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/FCTC_en.pdf.   
11
 Article 5(1) of the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes: 
http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf.  
12
 Kaare Norum, ‘World Health Organization’s Global Strategy on diet, physical activity and health: the process 
behind the scenes’ (2005) 49 Scandinavian Journal of Nutrition 83.  
13
 Paragraph 44. 
14
 Paragraph 50. 
  
In January 2004, as the food industry furore over the WHO’s proposed global diet strategy 
mounted, the WHO Executive Board was asked to approve applications for formal WHO 
Official Relations by two international food industry associations, The International Council 
of Grocery Manufacturer Associations (ICGMA) and Confédération des Industries Agro-
Alimentaires de l'UE (CIAA ), renamed as FoodDrinkEurope in June 2011 on the 
recommendation of the WHO Standing Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations. A 
decision was deferred and at the subsequent Executive Board meeting in May 2004, some 
government delegates questioned the recommendation in view of both groups having links 
with the tobacco industry.
15
 ‘The food industry is aggressively using its trade associations to 
influence international health policy’, complained the NGO INFACT (a prominent critic of 
the marketing of breast-milk substitutes) in a statement issued during the WHA in May 
2004.
16
 By the time the Executive Board met again in January 2005, the Board was still being 
invited to approve the two industry groups. It was only due to vigorous lobbying by NGO 
representatives, who distributed a statement pointing out that approval would mean WHO 
would be in violation of the ‘Principles Governing Relations between the World Health 
Organization and NonGovernmental Organizations’ set out its Basic Documents, the 
agency’s formal constitution, that both industry associations decided to ask that consideration 
of the proposal be further postponed, which was interpreted by public interest NGOs as a 
tactical retreat to avoid the embarrassment of rejection.
17
   
 
The food industry does have a positive role to play in ensuring that healthier products are 
available to consumers through product reformulation; however, companies and industry 
association cannot be relied upon to voluntarily sacrifice profits to achieve public interest 
objectives. In particular; food companies have no incentive to voluntarily curb marketing for 
unhealthy food to children, except to foil efforts to enact potentially far-reaching legislation 
in this field.  Indeed, the food industry has a vested interest in marketing its products to as 
broad an audience as possible in light of the fact that marketing increases preferences and 
purchase requests for unhealthy food. It is clear that the food industry has adopts strategic 
approaches to reconfigure and redirect their marketing to children following the 
implementation of Ofcom restrictions in the UK applicable to ads targeting children under 
age 16 and the voluntary industry commitment not to advertise to children under 12. Global 
market forecasts indicate that the confectionery trade within the food and beverage sector 
continues to project volume growth in per capita sales - inevitably ensuring that efforts to 
improve dietary health are undermined, particularly in target markets where populations are 
known to have a greater susceptibility to diet-related metabolic diseases.
18
  
 
The WHO recommendations on marketing to children, adopted six years after the WHO 
Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and Health was approved, contain emphatic 
recognition of the deleterious impact of industry involvement. They expressly warn 
governments to be wary of conflicts of interest. Recommendation 4 clearly states that:  
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‘governments should set clear definitions for the key components of the policy, 
thereby allowing for a standard implementation process. The setting of clear 
definitions would facilitate uniform implementation, irrespective of the implementing 
body. When setting the key definitions Member States need to identify and address 
any specific national challenges so as to derive the maximal impact of the policy.’ 
 
This is echoed in Recommendation 6 which put governments at the centre of the policy 
making process, urging them to act as: 
 
‘the key stakeholders in the development of policy…[and]…provide leadership, 
through a multi-stakeholder platform, for implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
In setting the national policy framework, governments may choose to allocate defined 
roles to other stakeholders, while protecting the public interest and avoiding conflict 
of interest.’  
 
If, as noted above, Governments are indeed in the best position to set direction and overall 
strategy to achieve population-wide public health goals, the reference to the establishment of 
multi-stakeholder platforms may create more confusion than it provides solutions for 
complex issues such as NCD control and prevention. The confusion is further compounded 
by Recommendation 7, which invites governments, on the basis of the resources, benefits and 
burdens of all stakeholders involved, to consider the most effective approach to reduce the 
marketing of unhealthy food to children, specifying however that ‘any approach selected 
should be set within a framework developed to achieve the policy objective’.  
 
In other words, the Recommendations seem to suggest that if the key parameters of a national 
policy on unhealthy food marketing to children should be set by governments, this does not 
preclude governments from involving food businesses in the implementation of these 
parameters.  
 
The warnings that Member States should avoid conflicts of interest are echoed in the WHO 
Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013-2020. This Action Plan, 
which urges Member States (among others) to halt the rise of diabetes and obesity worldwide 
by 2025, explicitly lists ‘the management of real, perceived or potential conflicts of interest’ 
as one of its overarching principles. This is further defined as meaning that: ‘public health 
policies for the prevention and control of NCDs must be protected from undue influence by 
any form of vested interest. Real, perceived or potential conflicts of interest must be 
acknowledged and managed.’ Less than a month after the adoption of the WHO Global 
Action Plan, WHO Director General  Margaret Chan went so far as to state: ‘Efforts to 
prevent non-communicable diseases go against the business interests of powerful economic 
operators […] In the view of WHO, the formulation of health policies must be protected from 
distortion by commercial or vested interests [our emphasis].’19 Dr Chan’s remarks reinforced 
earlier comments to health ministers which related food and beverage industry lobbying and 
conflicts of interest.
20
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To date, however, efforts of WHO Member States to elaborate principles of institutional 
conflicts of interest related to food have generally lacked sufficient specificity to guide 
Member States in designing effective, evidence-based NCD prevention and control policies. 
The final report of the WHO Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity continues to send 
mixed messages:  
 
The Commission recognizes the important role the private sector can play in 
addressing childhood obesity but that additional  accountability strategies, including 
legal, market-based and media- based mechanisms  are often necessary. Initiatives of 
the private sector (including retailers, food manufacturers, food services, insurers) to 
address obesity that are supported by an independent evidence base, should be 
considered. Conflict of interest risks need to be identified, assessed and managed in a 
transparent and appropriate manner. Codes of conduct and independently audited 
assessments of compliance with government oversight are therefore important. 
 
Governments can use their regulatory power to improve the food environment, to 
enforce regulatory standards, to implement internationally-recognized standards such 
as the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes,1 and the 
WHO Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-alcoholic 
Beverages to Children.
21
 
 
Such ongoing ambiguity has been used by the food industry to support its claim that it is a 
credible ‘partner’ in the fight against overweight and obesity, rather than an integral part of 
the problem. In particular, food businesses have made several ‘pledges’ and ‘commitments’ 
with a view to convincing public authorities that they can provide cost-effective solutions to 
the obesity epidemic. The next section focuses on the relevance of the EU Pledge in the 
implementation of the WHO Recommendations in European Union Member States. 
 
II. The EU Pledge or the EU Fudge? 
 
The impetus of European health ministers, among the government representatives who voted 
to approve the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health in May 2004, 
prompted the European Commission to consider its own response to the growing obesity 
epidemic. Its Directorate General for Health and Consumers followed up the adoption of the 
WHO Strategy with a series of informal obesity roundtable sessions involving some NGO 
and industry association representatives before it set up the EU Platform for Action on Diet, 
Physical Activity and Health in March 2005,
22
 as envisaged within the WHO Strategy itself. 
However, both the WHO and the European Commission did not address the issue of how to 
deal with ‘real, perceived or potential conflict of interest’. 
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The then Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner, Markos Kyprianou, warned that 
‘binding measures’ could follow if the food and beverage industries did not take adequate 
and rapid steps to address the obesity challenge.
23
 The main industry players, under pressure 
by constant media focus, lobbied hard against the concept of regulation and instead insisted 
that they should be given public plaudits for any small concessions they made. The implicit 
threat of any EU controls over the industry subsequently evaporated, and the Platform was 
stripped of the ‘Damocles Sword’ of regulation.  
 
By November the following year, the Commissioner’s softer stance drew criticism in the 
European Parliament, as well as from health NGOs on the Platform, expressing concern over 
conflicts of interest after DG SANCO itself convened a ‘name and praise’ press conference to 
which it invited the leading European executives of several major corporations including 
Coca Cola, PepsiCo, McDonald’s and Unilever. The companies were allowed to promote 
their brands within the EU headquarters in Brussels while Commissioner Kyprianou 
provoked adverse media coverage when he lauded what NGO members of the Platform felt 
were limited voluntary pledges inadequately addressing individual cases of reformulation, 
labelling or marketing to children.
24
 
 
Only a few days later, health ministers met in Istanbul to ratify the European Charter on 
Counteracting Obesity, developed by the WHO Regional Office for Europe. The Charter 
included the following reference for business:  
 
The private sector should play an important role and have responsibility in building a 
healthier environment, as well as for promoting healthy choices in their own 
workplace. This includes enterprises in the entire food chain from primary producers 
to retailers. Action should be focused on the main domain of their activities, such as 
manufacturing, marketing and product information, while consumer education could 
also play a role, within the framework set by public health policy. There is also an 
important role for sectors such as sports clubs, leisure and construction companies, 
advertisers, public transportation, active tourism, etc. The private sector could be 
involved in win-win solutions by highlighting the economic opportunities of investing 
in healthier options. 
 
The Charter remained vague about what specific changes were needed to reduce consumption 
of unhealthy food, and made no reference to the conflicts of interests involved in dealing with 
businesses with a vested interest in promoting the consumption of such food. Instead 
companies were encouraged to expect ‘win-win solutions’. so that the upward childhood 
obesity trend could be reversed by 2015 ‘at the latest’.25 
 
WHO’s policy guidance manual, linked to the Charter and published the following year, 
noted the emergence of the EU Platform as a model commenting: ‘Great emphasis has been 
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placed on the private sector’s delivering new initiatives, to demonstrate both its commitment 
and its ability to involve a substantial proportion of its members in joint action. Work is 
under way to develop a framework to monitor the implementation of actions and 
commitments undertaken via the Platform. Whether sufficient resources can be mobilized 
through the relatively minor changes envisaged to have any significant or lasting impact in 
combating the escalating rates of obesity in the EU is also an issue. Moreover, additional, 
comprehensive, coherent and effective strategies need to be developed and implemented 
across all sectors, not merely among the limited group of Platform participants; this is of 
paramount importance.’26 
 
The EU regulatory framework itself encouraged this unsatisfactory state of affairs by opting 
for a hands-off approach on the basis that legally binding, compulsory measures were not 
welcomed by the wider industry in Europe. The wording of Article 9(2) of the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive, which was then under discussion, is very revealing in this respect. 
It merely provides that ‘Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service 
providers to develop codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial 
communications, accompanying or included in children’s programmes, of [unhealthy foods], 
excessive intakes of which in the overall diet are not recommended’.27 One cannot fail to note 
that this provision stands in stark contrast to the ban the EU has imposed on the marketing of 
tobacco products in all media whose regulation falls within the scope of its powers.
28
 As far 
as unhealthy food is concerned, the European Commission and EU Member States have only 
undertaken to ‘encourage’ businesses to adopt their own pledges to restrict the marketing of 
such food to children.  
 
Anticipating the adoption of the AVMS Directive, food businesses adopted a range of EU-
wide pledges to restrict the marketing of unhealthy food to children. In particular, the Union 
of European Soft Drinks Associations (UNESDA), including Coca Cola and PepsiCo, made a 
range of public commitments in 2006, in particular claiming they would not market to 
children under 12 where they formed more 50% of the audience (a very weak standard 
compared to the UK Ofcom rule, which applies to children under 16 and the Quebec 
Consumer Protection Act which defines a children’s audience as having more than only 15% 
under age 13 and includes Internet, billboard and other types of advertising).
29
 This was 
followed by the adoption in 2007 of the EU Pledge whereby major food and beverage 
companies undertook not to promote their products to children under 12 on TV, print and 
Internet, ‘except for products which fulfil specific nutritional criteria based on accepted 
scientific evidence and/or applicable national and international dietary guidelines’. They also 
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pledged not to put product materials in primary schools, unless requested to.
30
 Launched with 
11 signatories in 2007, the EU Pledge now has 21 members which, together, account for over 
80% of food and beverage advertising expenditure in the EU.
31
 
 
The EU Pledge was seen as one of the first significant stakeholder Platform commitments. 
The World Federation of Advertisers (WFA), a prominent Platform member, which officially 
supports the EU Pledge, described it as ‘a response from industry leaders to calls made by the 
EU institutions for the food industry to use commercial communications to support parents in 
making the right diet and lifestyle choices for their children’.32 In particular, EU Pledge 
signatories have been challenged to adopt common criteria for defining products that should 
not be advertised, ending the practice of individual companies using their own standards to 
determine which of their products could be marketed to children under 12. The nutritional 
criteria which define products permitted to be marketed to children under 12 were published 
in the EU Pledge Nutrition White Paper.
33
  
 
However, as has already been discussed elsewhere,
34
 the EU Pledge’s contribution to public 
health and obesity prevention is not sufficient to consider that the Pledge is an effective tool 
of childhood obesity prevention. Firstly, it has not been signed by all food businesses in the 
EU and remains a voluntary commitment. Secondly, it does not apply to all media. In effect, 
while given the appearance of a major industry concession, in reality by 2007 many 
companies had already adopted new strategies to switch their advertising spending from the 
media covered by the EU Pledge, not least television, to media falling outside its scope. In 
particular, it did not originally cover company-owned websites (only third-party websites), 
thus allowing food businesses to target children through the use of different advergames.
35
 
This was addressed via the adoption of enhanced commitments in 2012 and 2014. The fact 
remains, however, that the EU Pledge still contains several loopholes, not least because it 
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does not apply to all media (for example, it does not apply to product packaging). In the same 
vein, the caveat that Pledge signatories do not promote their products in primary schools, 
‘except where specifically requested by, or agreed with, the school administration for 
educational purposes’ is extremely cynical: in an age of austerity where education budgets 
are tightened, one can easily imagine how educational establishments may be lured into 
accepting the sponsorship of food businesses. As the WHO Recommendations explicitly 
point out, schools and other settings where children gather should be free of any form of 
unhealthy food marketing.
36
 Similarly, if the 2012 enhanced commitment reduced the 
audience threshold to 35% of children under 12 years, as opposed to 50% originally, the fact 
remains that this will still leave food businesses free to promote unhealthy food during 
popular family programmes which, if they are watched by a high number of children, are also 
watched by a large number of adults, thus making the proportion of children below 35%. 
Children do not stop being exposed to the impact of television advertising when adults are 
present. Some of these shortcomings have been exposed in the annual EU Platform 
monitoring reports
37
 and have led the Commission to announce that it would ‘support the 
development of a definition of stricter age and audience thresholds for advertising and 
marketing and more consistent nutritional benchmarks across companies’.38 However, the 
ongoing debates relating to the revision of the AVMS Directive, discussed below, suggest 
that this may be difficult to achieve.  
 
Furthermore, as far as the implementation of the EU Pledge is concerned, and despite claims 
that none of the EU Pledge member companies promote unhealthy food to children under 12, 
the EU Pledge monitoring report for 2015 suggested that the overall compliance rate for 
television advertising amounted to 98.6%, whilst compliance on company websites was 
lower at 97%.
39
 The difficulty of regulating children’s exposure on the Internet was reflected 
in the EU Pledge’s lower compliance among corporate websites. The report acknowledged 
that monitoring since 2009 showed a downward trend in children’s exposure to television 
food advertising by EU Pledge member companies, but that children’s exposure to 
advertising for products that do not meet their self-determined nutrition criteria in all 
programmes was reduced only by 48% over all markets monitored in the past six years and 
that the reduction in exposure to advertising for all EU Pledge member companies’ products 
regardless of nutrition criteria was only 32%. However, the latest EU Pledge Monitoring 
Report, published in January 2017, claimed that children’s exposure to advertising for all 
company products had been reduced by nearly one third over six years, but that a much larger 
reduction (83%) had been achieved in curbing advertising of products not meeting nutritional 
criteria during children’s programmes. The switch of marketing focus to the internet and 
company websites may account for much of the reduction, but the report claimed that 95% of 
company sites complied with Pledge standards, acknowledging that one in 20 of the company 
sites breached the industry’s own code.40  
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An extension of the EU Pledge beginning in 2017 was outlined to the EU Platform for Action 
on Diet, Physical Activity and Health at its meeting on 9 March 2017. However, the criticism 
remains that caveats regarding limiting the application of the various elements of the Pledge 
to under 12s allows companies to evade compliance. A procedure to allow public complaints 
about breaches of EU Pledge commitments is under development and is due to be ready by 
the end of 2017. Companies are also promising to introduce common nutrition criteria which 
will include salt and sugar reductions mostly by the end of 2018.
41
 
 
The criticism remains that not only are EU Pledge commitments insufficiently broad in their 
coverage (both in terms of products, companies, media and ages covered), but the food and 
beverage industries have yet to fully implement the Pledge. However recently Dame Fiona 
Kendrick, chair & CEO of Nestlé UK & Ireland, broke ranks to support a call for regulation 
of the industry, acknowledging that: 
 
Critics of the voluntary approach have pointed to its limited take-up, and this 
perspective is understandable. For action to match the scale of the public health 
challenge, the entire UK food and drink industry needs to act, including the out-of-
home sector, for example. An unintended consequence of voluntarism is that 
companies that voluntarily invest to reformulate their products are disadvantaged 
compared to those that take time to act, or take only limited action.
42
 
  
While EU Pledge members may be challenged to deliver food and beverages which measure 
up to the benchmarks of ‘healthy’ and address the shortcomings that have been highlighted in 
the Pledge coverage, they should also be challenged to consider the context in which their 
brands, rather than specific products, are promoted. Coca Cola and McDonald’s sponsorship 
of the Olympics faced criticism for achieving significant brand exposure to young children at 
a time when the companies pledged not to advertise directly to them.
43
 The issue of sports 
sponsorship requires careful consideration by EU Pledge members if they are serious about 
fulfilling the spirit of their commitments to help reverse obesity. It is true that the WHO 
Recommendations refer to the marketing of products and services; they do not refer explicitly 
to the promotion of brands (as distinct from products and services). Nevertheless, as certain 
brands and organizations are clearly associated with products or services whose marketing 
could fall within the scope of the Recommendations, efforts to restrict marketing in this area 
also need to consider how brands are marketed, in line with the spirit of the 
Recommendations.
44
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Despite its many shortcomings, the EU Pledge is portrayed by the European Commission as 
one of the Platform’s success stories.45 Yet such acclaim ignores the overall impact that 
ubiquitous brand awareness achieves. More fundamentally, twelve years after the EU 
Platform was established, the EU has failed to acknowledge, let alone address, the questions 
of conflicts of interest and undue influence at the very heart of unhealthy food marketing self-
regulation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Much work remains to be done to clarify and operationalize the WHO’s hitherto vague and 
often internally inconsistent stances on conflicts of interest. Despite years of warning from 
the public health community that the food industry is a ‘vector of disease’ which has engaged 
in effective marketing campaigns to increase sales of unhealthy food, not least to children, 
and has opposed and challenged measures adopted by governments across the world to 
regulate their commercial practices, the WHO’s response still falls short. That businesses are 
consulted by governments to explain where their interests lie is one thing and can be seen as 
an integral part of the democratic process; that these businesses are regarded as credible 
partners in the prevention and control of NCDs and are, as such, entrusted with the 
development and implementation of public health policies, and participate in agenda-setting 
with money and influence, including the implementing of the WHO Recommendations on the 
marketing of unhealthy food to children, is a fundamentally different one. Businesses should 
be run within the rules that society places upon them.
46
 These rules can be determined 
through a thorough consultation process with all relevant parties, including industry operators 
which have a stake in the rules in question; however, the public interest should not be placed 
in the hands of businesses through the establishment of inadequately considered 
‘partnerships’ with such operators. This would amount to granting a seal of approval to large-
scale conflicts of interest, thus preventing any effective response to growing NCD rates in 
Europe and beyond.
47
 
 
Recent developments in global food governance are not reassuring. In the autumn of 2015, 
the WHO’s Department of Nutrition for Health and Development held a technical 
consultation to help elaborate technical guidance to Member States on how to avoid conflicts 
of interest and manage conflicts of interest that cannot be reasonably avoided in nutrition 
governance.
48
 The resultant guidance may assume a special relevance in light of the WHA’s 
subsequent adoption of the Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors (FENSA) 
which proposes to dramatically alter WHO’s relations with industry organizations, public 
interest organizations, and industry influenced non-governmental organizations (the latter for 
which the degree of commercial influence varies along a spectrum).
49
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Uncertainty is manifest about the Framework’s impact on the independence and effectiveness 
of the WHO.
50
 The final text of FENSA only states: 
 
44. WHO does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors that work to 
further the interests of the tobacco industry. WHO also does not engage with the arms 
industry.  
 
Engagement where particular caution should be exercised  
 
44bis WHO will exercise particular caution, especially while conducting due 
diligence, risk assessment and risk management, when engaging with private sector 
entities and other non-State actors whose policies or activities are negatively affecting 
human health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, norms and standards, in 
particular those related to non-communicable diseases and their determinants.  
 
However, so long as the WHO has only one Director General, one budget, and one 
Governing body (the WHA), it is impossible to financially support one part of WHO (e.g., a 
donation to buy something seemingly innocuous) without supporting another more 
vulnerable, fundamental public health function (e.g., standard-setting, policy-advising, or 
priority-setting).  The final FENSA agreement presumes that commercial organizations and 
industry associations might be motivated to engage with the WHO at their own expense, but 
not be interested in a way that might give rise to a conflict of interest. The ‘due diligence’ 
promised by WHO is a poor substitute for a clearly demarcated red-line. 
 
For the WHO to decide what is a conflict of interest on a case-by-case basis and, if so, how it 
should be dealt with, can undermine its legitimacy. Quantitative cut-offs (e.g., percentage and 
absolute amounts of revenue in US dollars per organization) should be adopted. If strict 
enough, these standards will increase the transparency and legitimacy of WHO’s policy on 
conflicts of interest and could reduce the amount of WHO staff time needed to perform due 
diligence deliberations. The answers to such questions will help reveal the candour of 
applicants and serve as a rationale for the WHO retaining previous donations that are 
subsequently found to be in contravention of its conflict of interest standards. To properly 
make these determinations, the WHO needs to ask current collaborators and applicants for 
Official Relations Status and donors to describe the mechanism or possible pathway of the 
stated conflict of interest, and to quantify the extent of that conflict of interest in US dollars. 
The answers to this question will help the WHO to determine if the conflict is direct or too 
remote or diffuse to be a concern, and should discourage the use of the Declaration of Interest 
                                                 
 A statement of concern issued by 60 public interest civil society groups during the May 2016 WHA meeting 
(echoing several other communiques published in recent years) was neither reflected in the final Framework nor 
even officially acknowledged by the WHO or Members States. That critique discorded sharply with the jubilant 
mood of Member States when they unanimously adopted the text in the final hours of the Assembly after a 
week-long series of in camera negotiations from which, ironically, all civil society organizations were excluded. 
The legitimacy of civil society worries is reflected in the continuing failure of the WHO to even publicly 
acknowledge that its second largest benefactor, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (which directly foots 
13%, $573,629,000, of the entire WHO $4,384,900,000 biennial budget for 2016-2017, a close second to the 
United States Government – see the WHO Budget Portal), holds billions of dollars’ worth of shares in soft drink 
bottlers, fast food and candy manufacturers, food and pharmaceutical retailers, and cable television companies
50
 
that sell products about which the WHO has issued recommendations for member states to regulate. 
  
statement as a venue to bury worrisome conflicts of interest disclosures among a series of 
innocuous confessions or further claims to institutional expertise. 
